Recent work in differential privacy has highlighted the shuffled model as a promising avenue to compute accurate statistics while keeping raw data in users' hands. We present a protocol in this model that estimates histograms with error independent of the domain size. This implies an arbitrarily large gap in sample complexity between the shuffled and local models. On the other hand, the models are equivalent when we impose the constraints of pure differential privacy and single-message randomizers.
Introduction
The local model [14] of differentially private computation has minimal trust assumptions: n users each execute a privacy-preserving algorithm on their data and send the output message to an analyzer. While this model has appeal to the users-their data is never shared in the clearthe analyzer receives very noisy signals. For example, the computation of d-bin histograms has Ω( √ log d /(ε √ n)) error in the local model [2] . But when users trust the analyzer with their raw data (the central model), there is an algorithm that achieves O(log(1/δ)/(εn)) error which notably is independent of d [6] . Because the local and central models lie at the extremes of trust, recent work has focused on the intermediary shuffled model [5, 7] . A protocol in this model commands each user to execute a randomized algorithm on their data, which generates a vector of messages. A trusted shuffler applies a uniformly random permutation to all messages. The anonymity provided by the shuffler allows users to introduce less noise than in the local model (to achieve the same level of privacy). This prompts the following questions:
How well separated is the shuffled model from the local model?
How close is the shuffled model to the central model?
Our Results
In this work, we provide a new protocol for histograms in the shuffled model. It achieves a bound on error that is independent of the number of bins d (Section 3). Table 1 presents existing results alongside ours: all previous bounds on error in the shuffled model depend on d. [8, 6, 3, 11] For data drawn from an underlying distribution, the results from [7, 1, 10] all imply a polynomial separation in sample complexity between the local and shuffled models. 1 In Section 3.3, we show that our histogram protocol implies a much stronger result: Theorem 1.1 (Informal). Under approximate differential privacy, the separation in sample complexity between the local and shuffled models can be made arbitrarily large.
We also prove that there are some problems which require polynomially more samples in the sequentially interactive local model than in the shuffled model. In Section 4, we complement Theorem 1.1 with a proof that the shuffled model collapses to the local model under more constrained settings: Theorem 1.2 (Informal). Under pure differential privacy with single-message randomizers, the shuffled model is equivalent to the local model.
Preliminaries
We define a dataset x ∈ X n to be an ordered tuple of n rows where each row is drawn from a data universe X and corresponds to the data of one user. Two datasets x, x ′ ∈ X n are considered neighbors (denoted as x ∼ x ′ ) if they differ in exactly one row. Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy [8] ). An algorithm M :
We say an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm satisfies pure differential privacy when δ = 0 and approximate differential privacy when δ > 0. For pure differential privacy, we may omit the δ parameter from the notation. [14] ). A protocol P in the (non-interactive 2 ) local model consists of two algorithms:
Definition 2.2 (Local Model
• A randomizer R : X → Y that takes as input a single user's data and outputs a message.
• An analyzer A : Y * → Z that takes as input all user messages and computes the output of the protocol.
We denote the protocol P = (R, A). We assume that the number of users n is public and available to both R and A. Let x ∈ X n . For ease of notation, we overload the definition of R and let R( x) = (R(x 1 ), . . . , R(x n )). The evaluation of the protocol P on input x is
Definition 2.3 (Differential Privacy for Local Protocols). A local protocol P = (R, A) satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy for n users if its randomizer R : X → Y is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
Definition 2.4 (Shuffled Model [5, 7] ). A protocol P in the shuffled model consists of three algorithms:
• A randomizer R : X → Y * that takes as input a single user's data and outputs a vector of messages whose length may be randomized. If, on all inputs, the probability of sending a single message is 1, then the protocol is said to be single-message.
• A shuffler S : Y * → Y * that concatenates all message vectors and then applies a uniformly random permutation. For example, when there are three users each sending two messages, there are 6! permutations and all are equally likely to be the output of the shuffler.
• An analyzer A : Y * → Z that takes a permutation of messages to generate the output of the protocol.
As in the local model, we denote the protocol P = (R, A) and assume that the number of users n is accessible to both R and A. The evaluation of the protocol P on input x is
Definition 2.5 (Differential Privacy for Shuffled Protocols [7] ). A shuffled protocol P = (R, A) satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy for n users if the algorithm (S•R) : X n → Y * is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
The Power of Multiple Messages for Histograms
In this section, we present an (ε, δ)-differentially private histogram protocol in the multi-message shuffled model whose simultaneous accuracy does not depend on the universe size. We start by presenting a private protocol for releasing a single count that always outputs 0 if the true count is 0 and otherwise outputs a noisy estimate. The histogram protocol uses this counting protocol to estimate the frequency of every domain element. Its simultaneous error is the maximum noise introduced to the nonzero counts: there are at most n, where n may be much smaller than d.
A Two-Message Protocol for Binary Sums
In the protocol P zsum ε,δ ( Figure 1 ), each user adds their true {0, 1} value to a Bernoulli value and reports a vector of that length. The contents of each vector will be copies of 1. Because the shuffler only reports a uniformly random permutation, the observable information is equivalent to a noisy sum. The noise is distributed as Bin(n, p), where p is chosen so that there is sufficient variance to ensure (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
To streamline the presentation and analysis, we assume that (100/n) · ln(2/δ) ≤ ε ≤ 1 so that p ∈ (1/2, 1). We can achieve (ε, δ) privacy for a broader parameter regime by setting p to a different function; we refer the interested reader to Theorem 4.11 in [7] . 
Theorem 3.1. For any ε, δ ∈ [0, 1] and any n ∈ N such that n ≥ (100/ε 2 ) · ln(2/δ), the protocol P zsum ε,δ = (R zsum ε,δ , A zsum ε,δ ) has the following properties:
iv. Each user sends at most two one-bit messages.
Proof of Part i. If we let z i be the random bit generated by the i-th user, the total number of messages is | y| = n i=1 x i + z i . Observe that learning | y| is sufficient to represent the output of shuffler since all messages have the same value. Thus, the privacy of this protocol is equivalent to the privacy of
By post-processing, it suffices to show the privacy of
Because privacy follows almost immediately from technical claims in [9] , we defer the proof to Appendix A.
, the following event occurs with probability ≥ 1 − β:
The remainder of the proof will assume E acc has occurred. We perform case analysis. If c * > 1, then we show that the error of c * − p is at most α ′ :
x i (By construction)
If c * ≤ 1, then the error is exactly 1 n x i . We argue that c * ≤ 1 implies 1 n x i ≤ α:
Rearranging terms yields
which concludes the proof.
Proof of Part iii. If x = (0, . . . , 0), then | y| is drawn from 0 + Bin(n, p), which implies c * ≤ 1 with probability 1. Hence, P zsum ε,δ ( x) = 0.
A Multi-Message Protocol for Histograms
In the protocol P hist ε,δ (Figure 2 
2. Output the concatenation of all m j .
1. For each j ∈ [d], let y (j) ← all messages of value j, then computec j ← A zsum ε,δ ( y (j) ).
2. Output (c 1 , . . . ,c d ).
Theorem 3.2. For any ε, δ ∈ [0, 1] and any n ∈ N such that n ≥ (100/ε 2 ) · ln(2/δ), the protocol P hist ε,δ = (R hist ε,δ , A hist ε,δ ) has the following properties:
i. P hist ε,δ is (2ε, 2δ)-differentially private in the shuffled model.
ii. P hist ε,δ has (α, β)-per-query accuracy for any β ≥ 2e −(25/ε 2 )·ln(2/δ) and
iii. P hist ε,δ has (α, β)-simultaneous accuracy for any β ≥ 2ne −(25/ε 2 )·ln(2/δ) and
iv. Each user sends at most 1 + d messages of length O(log d).
The accuracy guaranteed by this protocol is close to what is possible in the central model: there is a stability-based algorithm with simultaneous error O((1/(εn)) · ln(1/δ)) [6] . However, in P hist ε,δ , each user communicates O(d) messages of O(log d) bits.
It remains an open question as to whether or not this can be improved while maintaining similar accuracy.
Because the simultaneous error of a single-message histogram protocol is at least Ω((1/(εn)) · poly(log d)) [7] , this protocol is also proof that the single-message model is a strict subclass of the multi-message model. This separation was previously shown by [1] for the summation problem.
Proof of Part i. Fix any neighboring pair of datasets x ∼ x ′ . Let y ← S • R hist ε,δ ( x) and y ′ ← S • R hist ε,δ ( x ′ ). For any j = j ′ , the count of j in output of the shuffler is independent of the count of j ′ in the output because each execution of R zsum ε,δ is independent. As in Step (1) of A hist ε,δ , for j ∈ [d], let y (j) ( y ′ (j) resp.) be the vector of all messages in y ( y ′ resp.) that have value j.
, we will show that the distribution of y (j) is close to that of y ′ (j) . Let
So by Therorem 3.1 Part i, for any T ⊆ {j} * ,
(2ε, 2δ)-differential privacy follows by composition.
Proof of Part ii-iii. Notice that the j-th element in the outputc j is identically distributed with an execution of the counting protocol on the bits b i,j indicating if x i = j. Formally,c j ∼ P zsum ε,δ ({b i,j } i∈[n] ) for all j ∈ [d]. Per-query accuracy immediately follows from Theorem 3.1 Part ii.
To bound simultaneous error, we leverage the property that when c j ( x) = 0, the counting protocol will report a nonzero value with probability 0. Let Q = {j ∈ [d] : c j ( x) > 0} and let α be the error bound defined in Theorem 3.1 Part ii for the failure probability β/n.
This concludes the proof.
Applications
In this section, we argue that solving the pointer-chasing problem in the non-interactive local model requires arbitrarily more samples than the shuffled model. We also show that solving the multiparty pointer jumping problem in the sequentially interactive local model requires polynomially more samples than in the shuffled model. These two problems reduce to a task that we call support identification and we show that P hist ε,δ solves it with relatively few samples. Proof. For the purposes of this proof, we assume there is some bijection f between D and [d] so that any reference to j ∈ [d] corresponds directly to some f (j) ∈ D and vice versa. Consider the following protocol: execute P hist ε,δ on n samples from U H and then choose the items whose estimated frequencies are nonzero. We will prove that these items are precisely those of H, with probability at least 99/100.
For now, let t be an arbitrary positive integer. Let E samp be the event that some element in support H has frequency less than (t + 1)/n in the sample. Let E priv be the event that the histogram protocol (1) estimates the frequency of some element in H with error exceeding t/n or (2) overestimates the frequency of some element not in H. If neither event occurs, every element in H has estimated frequency at least 1/n and no element outside of H has estimated frequency more than 0. Hence, it suffices to show that E samp and E priv each occur with probability ≤ 1/200. By a balls-into-bins argument, it suffices to have n = O(th log h) users to ensure E samp occurs with probability ≤ 1/200, for any t ≥ 1. And by Theorem 3.2, it suffices to have n = t users to ensure that E priv occurs with probability ≤ 1/200, for a particular t = O((1/ε 2 ) · log(1/δ)). The proof is complete by a union bound. To solve a PC(k, ℓ) instance, note that it suffices to find the support. Because the support has constant size, P hist ε,δ can be used to solve the problem with just O((1/ε 2 ) · log(1/δ)) samples, independent of k and ℓ. But in the case where k = 2, [13] give a lower bound of Ω(ℓ/e ε ) for noninteractive local protocols. So there is an arbitrarily large separation between the non-interactive shuffled and non-interactive local models (Theorem 1.1). Definition 3.6 (Multi-Party Pointer Jumping Problem [12] ). The Multi-Party Pointer Jumping Problem is denoted MPJ(s, h) where s, h are positive integer parameters. A problem instance is U {Z 1 ,...,Z h } where each Z i is a labeling of the nodes at level i in a complete s-ary tree. Each label Z i,j is an integer in {0, . . . , s − 1}. The labeling implies a root-leaf path: if the i-th node in the path has label Z i,j , then the (i + 1)-st node in the path is the (Z i,j )-th child of the i-th node. A protocol solves MPJ(s, h) with sample complexity n if, given n samples from any U {Z 1 ,...,Z h } , it identifies the root-leaf path with probability at least 99/100.
As with pointer-chasing, MPJ(s, h) is immediately solved when the support is identified. This takes n = O(h log h · (1/ε 2 ) · log(1/δ)) samples in the shuffled model. But [12] give a lower bound of Ω(h 3 /(ε 2 log h)) for MPJ(s = h 4 , h) in the local model, even allowing for sequential interactivity. We emphasize that this does not immediately imply a polynomial separation between the models. Local Ω(ℓ/e ε ) [13] Ω(h 3 /(ε 2 log h)) [12] (k = 2) (s = h 4 , sequentially interactive)
Pure Differential Privacy in the Shuffled Model
In this section, we prove that a single-message shuffled protocol that satisfies ε-differential privacy can be simulated by a local protocol under the same privacy constraint. . For any single-message shuffled protocol P = (R, A) that satisfies ε-differential privacy, there exists a local protocol P L = (R L , A L ) that satisfies εdifferential privacy and P L ( x) is identically distributed to P( x) for any input x ∈ X n .
We start with the following claim, which strengthens a theorem in [7] for the special case of pure differential privacy in the shuffled model, ). Now consider Y n , the set of message vectors where each message belongs to Y .
which contradicts the fact that S • R is ε-differentially private. Now we are ready to prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Consider the aggregator A L that applies a uniformly random permutation to its input and then executes A. P L = (R, A L ) is a local protocol that simulates P, as it is trivial to see that the two protocols have the same distribution on the same inputs. And by Claim 4.2, the randomizer is ε-differentially private.
One might conjecture Claim 4.2 also holds for multi-message protocols and thus immediately generalize Theorem 4.1. However, this is not the case: Claim 4.3 (Informal). There exists a multi-message shuffled protocol that is ε-differentially private but its randomizer is not ε-differentially private.
The counterexample is described and analyzed in Appendix B.
Proof. When α = (e ε − 1)/(e ε + 1) observe that α ∈ [ε/ √ 5, 1) and Lemma A.3 implies that η is sampled from an (ε, δ, 1)-smooth distribution:
So by Lemma A.2, we have M neg is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
B Claim 4.2 does not Generalize
In this Appendix, we show that Claim 4.2 does not generalize to the multi-message case. This is achieved by describing the counter-example P Geo ε ( Figure 3 ) which computes a binary sum. 1. Output e ε e ε −1 · (| y| − e ε e ε −1 )
Claim B.1. For any ε > 0, the protocol P Geo ε = (R Geo ε , A Geo ε ) has the following properties: i P Geo ε is ε-differentially private.
ii R Geo ε is not ln(εn)-differentially private.
Proof of part i. In the protocol, each sample η is drawn from NB(r = 1/n, p). Due to independence, the sum over all n of these samples has the characteristic function
.
But this is the characteristic function of the geometric distribution with parameter p. 4 Choose any x ∈ {0, 1} n and let c = n i=1 x i . Observe that the sum over the random variables τ (Step 3) is distributed as Bin(c, p). It follows that the output of the shuffler is a string of 1's whose length is the sum of a sample from Geo(p) and a sample from Bin(c, p).
Choose any x ′ ∼ x where n i=1 x ′ i = c + 1. Suppose we could prove that, for any v ∈ N,
Then for all w ∈ N we have 
In either case, (1) holds, which completes the proof. 4 Geo(p) is the distribution of the number of failures until the first success, where the probability of success is p.
